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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL EUGENE MITCHELL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010473-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) (Supp. 1999); tax stamp violation, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106(2) (2000); and possession or use of a controlled substance, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999). This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1, Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion to suppress alleging that the 
seizure of evidence following a traffic stop violated defendant's Fourth Amendment nght 
asamst unreasonable searches and seizures? 
i 
Standard of Renen "The factual findings underlvmg a trial court s decision to grant 
or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous 
standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion 
given to the tnal judge's application of the legal standard to the facts/' State v Moreno, 910 
P 2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.), cert denied, 916 P 2d 909 (Utah 1996). 
2. Should this Court review defendant's nominal challenge to the tnal court's 
finding that defendant voluntanly consented to the search of his car9 
Standard of Review. "It is well established that a reviewing court will not address 
arguments that are not adequately bnefed." State v Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,304 (Utah 1998) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules relevant to a determination of this 
case are set forth below: 
U.S. Const, amend IV 
The nght of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly descnbmg the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann, § 41-6-117(1) (1998) 
It is a misdemeanor for any person to dnve or move or for the owner to 
cause or knowingly permit to be dnven or moved on any highway any vehicle 
or combination of vehicles which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger 
any person, or which does not contain those parts or is not at all times 
equipped with lamps and other equipment in proper condition and adjustment 
as required in this chapter or in rules issued by the department, or which is 
equipped in any manner in violation of this chapter or those rules or for any 
2 
person to do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required under this 
chapter or those rules. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-155 (1998) 
A person may not drive or move on any highway any motor vehicle . . . 
unless: 
(1) the equipment on each vehicle is in good working order and 
adjustment as required in this chapter; and 
(2) the vehicle is in safe and good mechanical condition so as: 
(a) not to endanger the driver or other occupant or any person or 
property upon the highway; and 
(b) not to emit pollutants in excess of those prescribed and permitted 
under the rules of the Air Quality Board created under Title 19, Chapter 
2, Air Conservation Act, or under rules made by local health departments. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant was charged by information with possession of a controlled substance w ith 
intent to distribute and with violating the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, both third degree 
felonies, and with illegal possession or use of a controlled substance, a class B misdemeanor. 
R. 07. After defendant was bound over for trial on all charges, he moved to suppress the 
evidence seized during the traffic stop. R. 12, 15. The trial court denied the motion. R. 25-
28. A jury convicted defendant as charged. R. 116. Defendant was thereafter sentenced to 
two concurrent prison terms of zero-to-five years, ordered to pay a fine of S 1,850, and 
ordered to pay a recoupment fee of $250. R. 121-22. The court suspended defendant's 
prison term and placed him on probation for 24 months. R. 122. The court also forfeited 
defendant's interest in an automobile and cash. R. 122. Defendant timely appealed. R. 127. 
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SiMMARYOF F A C T S 
On March 14, 2000, Trooper Rick Eldredge of the Utah Highway Patrol sat writing 
in his patrol car, which was parked on the southbound shoulder of U.S. Highway 191. R. 25; 
R. 163: 5-6, 33. As he sat there writing with the window rolled down, Trooper Eldredge 
heard a "loud clicking noise" coming from a car traveling northbound on the highway. R. 
163: 6, 33; see also R. 163: 55-56. Trooper Eldredge described the loudness as "like 
somebody across the road yell[ing] at [him]," and explained that "[i]t was a lot louder than" 
someone clapping hands loudly. R. 163: 34. When he raised his head to look, the car, driven 
by defendant, traveled past him. R. 163: 6, 34. Trooper Eldredge turned his vehicle around 
and caught up to defendant, traveling northbound along side him. R. 163: 6, 35-36, 54-55. 
When he did so, Trooper Eldredge rolled down his window to better listen to the loud 
clicking noise coming from defendant's car. R. 163:7,36-37. He concluded that the car was 
obviously not in proper mechanical order, but he could not determine the exact nature of the 
problem—whether it was a wheel about to fall off or something less dangerous. R. 163: 7-8, 
37, 52-53. Concerned that the car was a safety hazard, and suspecting a violation of Utah's 
traffic regulations, Trooper Eldredge stopped defendant. R. 163: 8, 10, 37. 
When Trooper Eldredge informed defendant that something was obviously wrong 
with his car, such as a wheel about to fall off, defendant acknowledged that "a drive line or 
a CV joint [was likely] going out." R. 163: 10, 38, 56-57.[ After defendant produced his 
'A CV joint, or "constant velocity joint," connects the front dnve line in a front-
wheel-drive vehicle. R. 163: 10-11. 
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driver's license and registration. Trooper Eldredge directed him to the rear of the patrol car 
where the trooper wrote a warning for an equipment violation. R. 163: 11-12,38-39. After 
completion of a driver's license, registration, and criminal background check, the trooper 
returned defendant's driver's license and registration, gave him the written warning, and told 
him that he was free to go. R. 163: 20, 40; see also R. 163: 21-22, 45-46.: 
Defendant testified that as he returned to his car, he thanked the trooper and asked 
whether there was someplace he could get the car checked. R. 163: 58-60.; Trooper 
Eldredge asked him if he was responsible for everything in the car. R. 163: 20-21. 
Defendant said no, then asked the trooper whether he had been issued a ticket or a warning. 
R. 163: 21. The trooper told him that it was a warning and again asked what defendant was 
responsible for in the car. R. 163: 21. Defendant told him he was only responsible for the 
jacket in the back seat and the suitcase in the trunk. R. 163: 21. The trooper then asked 
defendant if he was willing to sign a waiver consenting to the search of the car and its 
contents. R. 163: 21, 46. When defendant asked why, Trooper Eldredge said that he 
believed defendant was a drug smuggler. R. 163: 22. At this point, defendant appeared to 
become very alarmed. R. 163:28. Defendant then leaned against the car and asked if he had 
to let the trooper search. R. 163: 28. Trooper Eldredge responded that he was requesting a 
free and voluntary consent search. R. 163:28. Where defendant only claimed responsibility 
"Approximately ten minutes elapsed between the initial stop and the issuance of 
the warning ticket. R. 163: 17-18, 39-41; see also R. 163: 58. 
Trooper Eldredge did not recall defendant initiating the conversation. R. 163: 20. 
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for the jacket and suitcase. Trooper Eldredge said that he would not search those articles if 
he did not want him to do so. See R. 163: 28. 
After briefly discussing other things, defendant opened the door of his car, sat in the 
seat, and said/'Ifl don't let you search, you'll just search anyway/' R. 163:28. In response, 
Trooper Eldredge reiterated that he was asking for a voluntary consent to search, explained 
the waiver, and once again asked if he was willing to sign it. R. 163: 28-29. At that point, 
defendant stated, "I guess," whereupon the trooper read the waiver. R. 163: 29. When the 
trooper finished reading the waiver, defendant exited the car and signed it. R. 163: 29.4 
After signing the waiver, defendant retrieved the keys from the ignition and opened 
the trunk, revealing two duffel bags and a suitcase. R. 163: 30. Trooper Eldredge asked if 
he could search the suitcase as well. R. 163:30-31. Defendant responded affirmatively, took 
the suitcase out of the car, and gave the trooper the combination. R. 163: 31. After finding 
nothing but clothes in the suitcase, Trooper Eldredge searched the two duffel bags, finding 
large bricks of raw marijuana. R. 163: 31. Upon finding the marijuana, defendant was 
handcuffed and arrested. R. 163: 31. The trooper subsequently found other contraband on 
defendant's person and in the suitcase. R. 163: 32. 
^Although defendant testified that three times he refused consent and that he only 
acquiesced to the search after the trooper insisted that they would work something out if 
consent was not given, R. 163: 59-62, the trial court believed the trooper's account, rather 
than defendant's. R. 26 (holding that it "beheve[d] Eldredge's account because Eldredge 
turned out to be right about another disputed matter, i.e. what kind of citation was issued, 
and because of [defendant's] obvious interest in seeing the motion granted"). 
6 
At the suppression hearing. Trooper Eldredge explained that during the course of the 
stop, the following factors led him to believe defendant was trafficking drugs: (1) an 
overwhelming odor of air freshener emanated from the vehicle when defendant rolled down 
his window; (2) a very large handicapped parking permit hung from the rear view mirror; but 
defendant showed no signs of physical disability; (3) the car carried Nebraska plates, but 
defendant's driver's license was from Iowa; (4) the car was not registered to defendant, but 
to a female from Omaha, Nebraska; (5) a cellular phone lay on the seat next to defendant; (6) 
a "Christian Radio Broadcasting" sticker appeared to be strategically placed on the rear side 
window so as to obstruct a view into the car; (7) defendant explained that the car had broken 
down after his girlfriend and her girlfriend had driven it to Phoenix, and to avoid a costly 
repair, they flew back to Omaha and he flew to Phoenix to repair the car; (8) defendant could 
give neither the telephone number nor the address of his girlfriend in Omaha; (9) defendant 
paused before answering the trooper's simple question as to what kind of work his girlfriend 
did; (10) defendant rarely made eye contact with the trooper; and (11) defendant appeared 
very nervous, perspiring beads of sweat from his forehead and the bottom of his lip in mild 
temperatures. See R. 163: 11-16, 22, 41-44, 49-50. Based on the trooper's training and 
experience, he believed these factors supported a belief that defendant was a drug trafficker. 
R. 163: 22-27, 46-47.5 
'Trooper Eldredge had been involved in ten to twelve stops resulting in the seizure 
of marijuana quantities of more than 50 pounds, and additional stops resulting in the 
seizure of large quantities of other controlled substances. R. 163: 24. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the evidence should have been suppressed because his consent 
to search was obtained by police exploitation of a prior police illegality. However, because 
there was no police misconduct, defendant's claim fails. Trooper Eldredge's stop of 
defendant was justified at its inception. The trooper heard a loud clicking noise coming from 
defendant's car as it traveled past him, giving rise to a reasonable belief that the car was not 
in good working order as required under Utah's traffic rules and regulations. The trooper's 
inquiries regarding defendant's destination and travel plans, his alleged girlfriend, and the 
handicap parking permit were within the scope of the stop and were otherwise justified 
because defendant was not the registered owner of the vehicle. The tnal court found that 
defendant's subsequent consent to search the vehicle, which occurred during a voluntary 
conversation after the detention had terminated, was voluntary. This Court should not 
address defendant's nominal challenge to that finding because it was not adequately briefed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE SEIZURE OF CONTRABAND FROM DEFENDANT'S CAR DID NOT 
VIOUATE HIS FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST 
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
On appeal, defendant argues that the evidence seized following the traffic stop was 
the product of police misconduct. Aplt. Brf. at 8-12. He reasons that "[b]ecause [he] was 
unlawfully detained when he consented to a search of [the] vehicle, his consent is invalid/* 
8 
Aplt. Brf. at 13. Because the stop was justified at its inception and in its scope, defendants 
claim fails. 
A. ATTENUATION ANALYSIS, 
"Voluntary consent to a search is one of the well established exceptions to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment." State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1342-43 (Utah App. 
1991) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043 (1973)). 
However, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, first articulated in Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963), "has been extended to invalidate consents which, 
despite being voluntary, are nonetheless the exploitation of a prior police illegality." State 
v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 690 (Utah 1990). Thus, in deciding whether a consent following 
police misconduct is valid, the court must determine ^whether the "tainf of the Fourth 
Amendment violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence/" 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993) (quoting New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 
14, 19, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1643-44 (1990)).6 Of course, the Court need not undertake an 
"attenuation'' analysis where there is no finding of police misconduct. Cf. Thurman, 846 
P.2d at 1262 (holding that the "attenuation" analysis "is triggered only if the prior illegality 
is a violation of the Fourth Amendment"). 
5As in any consent search, a consent following police misconduct must also be 
voluntary. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688-89. Courts have thus described the "attenuation" 
analysis as a two-part test. Id. The State must establish that (1) the consent was 
voluntary, and (2) the consent was not obtained "by police exploitation of the prior 
illegality." Id: accord State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1991). 'fc[T]he 
analysis used to determine voluntariness is the same without regard to whether the 
consent was obtained after illegal police conduct." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262. 
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B. A T T E M ATION A.N AL\ SIS IS NOT APPLICABLE BECALSE THERE \ V \ S NO PRIOR 
POLICE ILLEGALITY. 
The controlling issue on appeal is \\ hether defendant's consent to search was obtained 
as a result of police misconduct. Defendant claims that the traffic stop was unlawful for tw o 
reasons. First, he contends that Trooper Eldredge did not have reasonable suspicion to make 
the stop. Aplt. B.rf. at 8-9. Second, he contends that even if the stop was initially justified. 
Trooper Eldredge unlawfully extended the scope of the stop. Aplt. Brf. at 9-11. Both 
contentions lack merit. 
Traffic stops constitute a seizure subject to Fourth Amendment protections. Delaw are 
v. Prowse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396(1979). Because "a traffic stop is limited 
and is more like an investigative detention than a custodial arrest," it must satisfy the two-
part test established by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 
S.Ct. 1868(1968). State v. Parker, 834P.2d592, 594 (Utah App. 1992). First, the stop must 
be "Justified at its inception.'" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994) {quoting 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879). Second, the resulting detention must be 
~* reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first 
place/" Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879). Further questioning is 
permitted only if (1) additional facts arise in the course of the stop that create a reasonable 
suspicion of other illegal activity, Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132, or (2) the detention terminates 
and the questioning is consensual, see State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994). 
Accord United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1429-30 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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1. The Traffic Stop Was Justified At its Inception. 
Defendant first argues that the traffic stop itself was not valid. Aplt. Brf. at 8-9. A 
traffic stop is justified at its inception if it is "incident to a traffic violation committed in the 
officers] presence." State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1990). "Stopping a 
vehicle may also be justified when the officer has 'reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
driver is committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol or 
driving without a license . . . [or that] the driver is engaged in more serious criminal activity, 
such as transporting drugs.'" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. Thus, "as long as an officer suspects 
that the 'driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment 
regulations,' the police officer may legally stop the vehicle." Id. (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. 
at661,99S.Ct. at 1400). 
Contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, Trooper Eldredge reasonably suspected that 
defendant was committing a traffic offense. Section 41-6-117 makes it unlawful to dnve a 
vehicle that is "in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person" or that "is not at all times 
equipped with lamps and other equipment in proper condition" Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
117(1) (1998) (emphasis added). Similarly, section 41-6-155 requires that a vehicle's 
equipment be "in good working order and adjustment" and that the vehicle otherwise be "in 
safe and good mechanical condition so as . . . not to endanger the driver or other occupant 
or any person or property upon the highway." Utah Code Ann. §41-6-155(1998) (emphasis 
added). Trooper Eldredge was alerted to defendant's car when he heard a "loud clicking 
noise" coming from the car as it traveled past him on the highway. R. 163:6,33. Believing 
tl 
that something might be wrong with the car, the trooper turned his vehicle around, caught 
up to defendant, and traveled along side him to better assess the noise. R. 163*. 6-8, 35-3" .^ 
Although Trooper Eldredge could not determine the exact nature of the problem, he could 
tell that defendant's car was "obvious[ly]" not in proper mechanical condition—perhaps "a 
wheel about to come off or something else [ ] less dangerous." R. 163: 7-8, 37. These facts 
supported a reasonable suspicion that defendant was in violation of sections 41-6-117 and 
-155 requiring that a vehicle be kept in good mechanical condition.7 
As Trooper Eldredge testified at the suppression hearing, the "loud clicking noise'' 
was clearly "out of the ordinary"—"the general motoring public do[ ] not have those type of 
noises coming from their vehicle[s] as they travel down the highway." R. 163: 37. Once the 
trooper verified that the unusual clicking noise was coming from defendant's car, it was 
"obvious . . . that something was the matter." R. 163: 7. The abnormal and loud clicking 
noise thus supported a reasonable belief that the equipment on the vehicle was not in good 
mechanical condition as required by law. As such, the trooper's stop of defendant was 
justified at its inception. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. 
Defendant argues that the stop by Trooper Eldredge was a mere "subterfuge" to a 
"hunch that something [else] was amiss." Aplt. Brf. at 8, 10.8 However, the law is well 
Although Trooper Eldredge did not identify the statute on the warning, he testified 
that he relied on sections 41-6-117 and -155. R. 163: 9, 38-39. 
^Defendant "conjectures" that Trooper Eldredge may have decided to stop him 
based on the out-of-state plates, the handicap permit, and the "Christian Radio 
Broadcasting" sticker. Aplt. Brf. at 7-9. This is pure speculation—nothing in the record 
suggests that the trooper observed these items before pulling defendant over, much less 
12 
settled that so long as an officer "observes a traffic violation" or "specific articulable facts 
[ ] give [the] officer reasonable suspicion to believe that a driver is committing a traffic 
offense," he is "constitutionally justified" in making the stop. Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1135. 
'This is so despite the officer's motivations or suspicions that are unrelated to the traffic 
offense." Id. Because the trooper here had reasonable suspicion of an equipment violation, 
the stop was thus constitutionally justified. 
2. The Traffic Stop Was Justified in its Scope. 
Defendant next contends that the trooper improperly extended the detention, asking 
him "numerous unrelated questions he had no business asking." Aplt. Brf. at 9-11. 
Defendant, however, does not identify the objectionable questions, much less explain why 
they were unrelated. See Aplt. Brf. at 10-11. Because the appellate court is "'not a 
depository in which [a] party may dump the burden of argument and research/" this Court 
should decline to review defendant's claim that the trooper exceeded the scope of the stop. 
See State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, f 28, — Utah Adv. Rep — {quoting State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)) (other internal quotes omitted). 
In any event, the trooper's questioning did not exceed the scope of the stop. Trooper 
Eldredge requested defendant's driver's license and registration. R. 163: 10. Upon 
examination, he noted that defendant's license was issued in Iowa, but the car was registered 
that they prompted him to make the stop. Moreover, defendant's acknowledgment of a 
problem with the drive line or CV joint substantiates the trooper's testimony that he 
stopped defendant because of the noise. Cf. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1138-39 (observing that 
"the more evidence that a detention was motivated by police suspicions unrelated to the 
traffic offense, the less credible the officer's assertion that the traffic offense occurred"). 
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in Nebraska to a third party. R. 163: 12. The trooper requested from dispatch a computer 
check on the driver's license, registration, and defendant's criminal history. R. 163: 14, 17-
18. While awaiting dispatch's report, the trooper wrote the warning ticket and asked 
defendant about the discrepancy in the license and registration. R. 163: 14, 17-18. 
Defendant explained that he was driving the car back from Arizona where it broke down 
after his girlfriend had driven it to Phoenix with her girlfriend. R. 163: 14-15. Defendant 
explained that to avoid a costly repair, the two women flew back to Omaha and he flew to 
Phoenix to repair the car and drive it back to Nebraska. R. 163: 14-15. Suspicious of 
defendant's explanation, the trooper asked for the girlfriend's telephone number or address. 
R. 163: 16. Defendant was unable to provide either. R. 163: 16. When defendant explained 
that his girlfriend had not come with him because she had to work, the trooper asked what 
she did. R. 163: 16. Only after a pause of a couple of seconds did defendant indicate that 
she was a secretary. R. 163: 16, 26. Observing no signs of disability in defendant, the 
trooper also inquired about the handicap parking permit. R. 163: 13, 18-19,42. Defendant 
said that it belonged to him because he had a hurt back. R. 163: 42. 
The trooper's inquiries were within the scope of a routine traffic stop. The law is well 
settled that "'an officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and 
vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation.'" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 
1132-33 {quoting Robinson, 191 P.2d at 435). He may also request that the driver exit the 
vehicle. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S.Ct. 330, 333 (1977). Other 
preliminary questioning has also been held to be permissible, such as inquiries regarding 
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destination and purpose of travel. See United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 iSth Or. 
2001) (holding that officer may "make inquiries as to the motorist's destination and purpose" 
during a lawful traffic stop). Accordingly, nothing in the officer's questioning exceeded the 
scope of the traffic stop. 
In any event, the discrepancy between the driver's license and vehicle registration 
warranted further inquiry. As held by the Utah Supreme Court, "the fourth amendment 
allows officers to further detain the vehicle and its occupants when the driver fails to produce 
identification or is not the owner." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991). 
Trooper Eldredge was thus justified in asking about defendant's travel plans, as well as the 
handicap parking permit, in an effort to ascertain and verify defendant's authority to possess 
the car. See, e.g., United States v. Galindo-Gonzales, 142 F.3d 1217, 1224 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that officer "confronted with a motorist who cannot produce proof of ownership 
may ask questions about the identity and travel plans of the driver and passengers"); State 
v. Carlson, 102 Ohio App.3d 585, 657 N.E.2d 591 (Ohio App. 1995) (holding that where 
officer was "given a vehicle registration listing an owner and a state different from that of 
[the motorist's] driver's license, it was reasonable for [him] to ask questions about the 
registered owner to verify whether [the motorist] had permission to use the vehicle"). 
Moreover, the trooper was warranted in asking for the girlfriend's address and telephone 
number because an officer need not blindly accept a driver's mere assertion that he has 
permission from the owner to drive the car. See United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 447 
(10th Cir. 1990) (holding that officer was justified in detaining driver while he tried to 
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contact registered owners), cert, denied, 499 U.S. 924, 111 S.Ct. 1318 (1991). This is 
especially true where defendant's story is not entirely credible. 
After dispatch reported back with the computer checks, the trooper returned the 
license and registration, issued the warning ticket, and told defendant he was "free to go." 
R. 163: 20. The traffic stop thus ceased to be a detention and the ensuing conversation 
resulting in defendant's consent to search was a voluntary encounter that no longer required 
Fourth Amendment protections. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 
S.Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980) (holding that the constitutional safeguards are invoked only when 
there is a seizure). To the extent defendant claims this conversation was not justified by 
reasonable suspicion and otherwise exceeded the scope of the stop, it must fail because the 
trial court concluded that defendant was no longer detained. See R. 163: 26-27. 
Although defendant has not challenged that finding on appeal, the record supports the 
tnal court's conclusion. After issuing the written warning, the trooper returned to defendant 
his driver's license and the vehicle registration. R. 163: 20, 40. He then expressly told 
defendant that he was "free to go," whereupon defendant began walking back to his car. R. 
163: 20. Based on "the words of [the trooper] and from the clear import of the 
circumstances," a reasonable person would believe he was free to leave. See Higgins, 884 
P.2datl244. 
* * * 
In summary, the trooper was justified in stopping defendant's vehicle on reasonable 
suspicion that it was not in good working order. His questioning of defendant was also well 
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withm the permissible scope of the stop and was further justified because defendant was not 
the registered owner. Therefore, because there was no police misconduct or illegality, 
Arroyo 's attenuation analysis is not applicable and defendant's claim must fail. 
II. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT ADEQUATELY BRIEFED ANY CHALLENGE TO 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CONSENT WAS 
VOLUNTARY 
Having found no police misconduct, the trial court also concluded that defendant's 
"consent was not coerced by [Trooper] Eldredge and must be considered voluntary." R. 27. 
Defendant only nominally challenges that finding, asserting that "the State still has the 
burden to prove that [his] consent to the search was voluntary." Aplt. Brf. at 13. While the 
State bears the burden at a suppression hearing of establishing voluntary consent to search, 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263, the burden of demonstrating error in the trial court's denial of 
a suppression motion rests with the defendant on appeal. See State v. Smith, 1999 UT App 
370, 1| 9, 995 P.2d 14 (holding that "[a]ppellant bears the burden of demonstrating the 
validity of [his] points on appeal"), cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). Defendant has 
failed to meet that burden. 
w
*[T]he question whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the 
product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question . . . to be determined from the 
totality of all the circumstances." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 
2041, 2047-48 (1973); accord State v. Eisner, 2001 UT 99, «| 47, 435 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(recognizing Schneckloth s totality of the circumstances test as the appropriate analysis in 
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consent searches).' The Supreme Court in Bisner held that in reviewing the "totality of all 
the surrounding circumstances," courts should consider the following factors: 
" 1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence 
of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) 
cooperation by the owner of the [property]; and 5) the absence of deception or 
trick on the part of the officer/' 
Bisner, 2001 UT 99, atf 47 {quotingState v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980)). 
Defendant does not discuss these factors or any other circumstance surrounding his 
consent. Instead, his argument is limited to a bald assertion that he "simply acceded to 
Trooper Eldredge's clear intention to search the car." Aplt. Brf. at 13. He does not claim or 
otherwise cite to evidence in the record that the trooper said he had a nght to search or that 
defendant was required to permit the search. See Aplt. Brf. at 12-13. He does not claim or 
cite to evidence in the record that the trooper used trickery, deception, or a show of force to 
obtain consent. See Aplt. Brf. at 12-13. He does not contend that he did not cooperate in the 
search, nor does he identify any other circumstance in the record which suggests that his 
consent was the product of coercion. See Aplt. Brf. at 12-13. Defendant fails to marshal the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings. See State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^ f 17 n.2, 
1 P.3d 1108 (holding that to successfully challenge trial court's findings, appellant must first 
marshal all the evidence that supports those findings); see also Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262 
(holding that "[voluntariness is primarily a factual determination"). He also fails to include 
''Defendant cites to the three-part analysis applied in State v. Hansen, 2000 UT 
App353,«I 18, 17P.3d 1135, cert, granted, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2001). Aplt. Brf. at 12. 
However, the Supreme Court has since rejected the voluntariness test used in Hansen. 
Bisner, 2001 UT 99, at ffl[ 44, 47. 
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in the record on appeal the video audio tape of the stop. See Aplt. Brf. at 13, R. 103:03-65: 
see also State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985) (holding that "[i]t is the appellant's 
duty to bring his appeal to [the court] supported by an adequate and proper record"). 
Defendant does cite to Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 
(1983), for the proposition that the State's burden of proving voluntary consent "is not 
satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority," and to Hansen. 
setting forth the since-rejected three-part consent analysis. Aplt. Brf. at 12-13. However, 
he does not explain how those cases apply here. As observed by the Utah Supreme Court, 
the rules "require[ ] not just bald citation to authonty but development of that authonty and 
reasoned analysis based on that authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) 
(referring to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)). Because this Court is '"not a depository in which [a] 
party may dump the burden of argument and research,'" it should decline review of 
defendant's nominal claim that his consent was not voluntary. See Norris, 2001 UT 104, at 
1J 28 {quoting Bishop, 753 P.2d at 450) (other internal quotes omitted). In any event, the 
record amply supports the trial court's finding of voluntary consent.10 
InFor example, while defendant may have appeared somewhat uncertain at first, he 
otherwise cooperated with the trooper. See R. 163: 27-31. He signed the wntten consent, 
retrieved the keys, opened the trunk, removed the suitcase, and provided the combination. 
R. 163: 28-31. In obtaining the consent, Trooper Eldredge made no claim of authonty to 
search the car, but merely requested permission. See Bisner, 2001 UT 99, at *j 47. When 
defendant asked if he had to permit the search of his car, the trooper responded that he 
was simply "requesting a free and voluntary" consent. R. 163: 28. Moreover, when 
defendant asserted that the trooper would conduct a search even without his consent, the 
trooper ^reiterated [ ] that [he] was asking for a consent to search." R. 163: 28. Finally, 
the record does not reflect a show of force by the trooper, nor the use of deception or tnck 
to obtain the consent. See Aplt. Brf. at 27-31. 
19 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the tnal 
court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress. 
Respectfully submitted this j 1 day of January, 2002. 
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RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 0017-21 
The first question presented by this motion is whether Trooper 
Eldredge had reason :o suspect a violation of the law by Mitchell, 
who was driving north on S.R. 191 at milepost 58. Eldredge heard 
a loud clicking noise coming from the vehicle and when he stopped 
Mitchell, told Mitchell that he was afraid a wheel might be coming 
off. Mitchell answered that there was probably something wrong 
with the constant velocity joint or the drive line. 
Section 41-6-117, Utah Code, prohibits driving a vehicle which 
is not equipped as required by law or which "is in such unsafe 
condition as to endanger any person..." The court has not been 
able to identify any specific equipment violation, so the state 
must rely on this general requirement of safety. No evidence was 
presented on what the malfunction turned out to be. Ultimately, 
Eldredge was prepared to let the vehicle travel on down the road. 
However, this does not mean that the vehicle was safe. Officers 
roucmely permit vehicles to proceed, even though lacking proper 
lights, horns, mirrors, windshields, etc., upon a promise by the 
owner to fix the problem. 
Not every mechanical problem justifies concern for public 
safety. However, belief that the noise may indicate that a wheel is 
coming off - as Eldredge thought - or that there is a problem with 
the drive line - as Mitchell thought - reasonably generates 
sufficient concern about public safety to justify stopping the 
vehicle. Eldredge's concern was at least as serious as the 
concerns that resulted in enactment of numerous sections following 
41-6-117, and culminating in Section 41-6-155. The initial stop 
was accordingly justified. 
After stopping Mitchell, and issuing a written warning for 
equipment and other violations, Eldredge told Mitchell that he was 
free to go, and returned all of Mitchell's documents. Although 
Eldredge's videotape recorded the conversation that followed, 
Eldredge's personal microphone malfunctioned. Eldredge and 
Mitchell describe the conversation differently. The court believes 
Eldredges's aiccount because Eldredge turned out to be right about 
another disputed matter, i.e. what kind of citation was issued, and 
because of Mitchell's obvious interest in seeing the motion 
granted. Eldredge asked Mitchell how responsible he was for what 
was in the vehicle. The conversation eventually ended with 
Mitchell consenting to a search of his vehicle. 
Mitchell contends that Eldredge had no reasonable suspicion to 
expand the scope of the stop. Although the state asserts that 
Eldredge had reasonable suspicion, the court does not reach that 
question because it agrees with the state that returning Mitchell's 
documents to him and telling him that he was free to go converted 
what had been a level two stop into a level one citizen-police 
encounter. Mitchell was as free to ignore Eldredge and drive off 
as anyone the police approach at home, on the street or stopped 
alongside the highway. 
Mitchell also contends that his consent was not voluntary. 
While Mitchell may have been uncomfortable, and unsure about what 
would follow a refusal, his consent was not coerced by Eldredge and 
must be considered voluntary. 
The motion to suppress is denied. Defendant is ordered to 
appear before the court on August 17, 2000, at 9:30 a.m. for trial 
setting. 
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